CLUBELLINES PALLY

7 February 1963

MEMORANDUM

- l. Mr. McNamara's presentation yesterday demonstrated the scope of our intelligence on Cuba. So much was given to the public and, therefore, to the Soviets that our collection capabilities for the future may have been compromised.
- 2. Mr. McNamara's figures do not differ in any major way from those agreed within the Intelligence Community, and used by me in closed Congressional hearings. However, the general impression left by his presentation and answers to questions differed from that which I have expressed to the Mahon and Stennis Subcommittees, to the Executive branch of the Government and partially in my public statement which was a USIB approved statement.
- 3. The statement I made public yesterday with your approval went as far as the intelligence Community felt it could safely go in releasing information, both on means of collection, and on the intelligence obtained thereby. The Department of Defense went well beyond this in revealing numbers and precise dates of overflights. The fact that we use light loading of ships to identify them as arms carriers was also made public.
- 4. On the substantive side, Mr. McNamara gave a series of precise numbers, characteristics, measurements, and designations which will clearly reveal to the USSR the extent of our capabilities against its forces in Cuba. Although a number of these details and photographs have been released separately from time to time, the impact of this mass of information has caused widespread speculation in the press that we have the same capabilities against the USSR itself, coupled with a strong implication that we gather such information by the use of reconneissance satellites.



STORET CALLY

- 5. Disclosures trespass upon the Director of Central Intelligence responsibility under Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 which states "That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."
- 6. While I knew of tentative arrangements to give the press a background briefing on what we knew about Seviets in Cuba, as discussed with me by Mr. Salinger and Secretary McNamara on Tuesday, 5 February, the extent of the briefing, the disclosure of factual details concerning amounts and characteristics of Soviet equipment, the disclosure of number of overflights and the time of them, and facts on shipping analysis all came as a surprise to me.

SECRETEVES ONLY